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6篇 您的检索式:作者名="LE Meilong"
    题名 作者 年代 出处 被引量
1The integrated optimization of container terminal scheduling with uncertain factors显示文摘Yiqin Lu Meilong Le 2014Computers & Industrial Engineering2014,,:1
2The innovation of third-party logistics service under supply chain constraints 显示文摘ZHOU Qing LE Meilong 2004The Journal of Anhui University2004,28,5:1
3Solving the airline recovery problem based on vehicle routing problem with time window modeling and Genetic Algorithm显示文摘Le Meilong 2013International Conference on Natural Computation2013,9,3:1
4The RHSA Strategy for the Allocation of Outbound Containers Based on the Hybrid Genetic Algorithm显示文摘安全存储院子是容器交通的最佳的核心目标之一;因此,做必要存储安排成为了容器终端管理系统(CTMS ) 的最关键的部分。这篇论文为随机进入院子的开往外地的集装箱调查一个随机的混合的叠算法(RHSA ) 。在 RHSA 的第一个阶段,在块之中的分发关于利用比率被分析。在第二个阶段,海湾配置的优化被使用混合基因算法执行。而且,一个实验被执行测试 RHSA。结果证明探索算法是有用的增加效率。Meilong Le Hang Yu 2013Journal of Marine Science and Application2013,12,3:1
5Three-stage decision approach of network dynamic pricing and seat inventory control显示文摘The dynamic joint pricing and seat inventory control is more practical but complicated in both formulation and solving.This paper presents a three-stage decision approach(TSDA)to attack this problem.In the first stage,the relationship between dynamic prices and their pre-sale periods is built.The game process between passengers and the airline based on maximisation of both passenger utility and airline’s network revenue is applied.Passenger’s booking and cancellation processes are simulated according to respective distributions.In the second stage,the seat allocation model for different itineraries is built based on presented unified prices.It greatly decreases computation complexity since prices,itinerary legs and pre-sale time periods are excluded from combination.In the third stage,itinerary-based revenue management model is built with embedding the nested control strategy inside.Meanwhile,some practical factors such as cancellation and no-show are considered.The experimental computation results show TSDA is effective.Jinmin Gao Meilong Le 2022Journal of Control and Decision2022,9,1:0
6Airline Alliance Revenue Distribution Considering Horizontal and Vertical Competition显示文摘Considering the existence of multi-level fares in the alliance,and the existence of horizontal competition and vertical competition at the same time,this paper intends to maximize the revenue of airline alliance and fairly distribute the revenue to member airlines.Firstly,a model is built under the centralized mechanism,in which all airlines in the alliance are regarded as a whole.By solving the model,the shadow price of each flight leg on the code-sharing route is gotten.It is used to calculate the proportion of the revenue distribution.Then,the centralized model is decomposed into the single airline model by the proportion.The seat allocation among airlines and distributed revenue can be gotten by solving the model.Three typical examples are designed to test it.The results show that,the model can effectively reflect the managerial principal of the airline alliance,that is maximizing total revenue and fairly distributing the revenue among member airlines.Le Meilong Fang Yuan 2018Transactions of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics2018,35,S1:0
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