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121篇 您的检索式:作者名="Martimort"
    题名 作者 年代 出处 被引量
1Monitoring a common agent: implications for financial contracting显示文摘Khalil F Martimort D Parigi B 2007Journal of Economic Theory2007,135,1:1
2Collusion, delegation and supervision with soft informa-tion显示文摘FAURE-GRIMAUD A LAFFONT J J MARTIMORT D 2003Review of Economic Studies2003,70,2:1
3Collusion under asymmetric infor- mation显示文摘Laffont J J Martimort D 1997Econometrica1997,65,4:1
4Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions显示文摘Frédéric Koessler David Martimort 2012Journal of Economic Theory2012,,5:1
5To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships显示文摘Martimort D Pouyet J 2008Interna- tional Journal of Industrial Organization2008,26,3:1
6Exclusive Dealing,Common Agency,and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory显示文摘Martimort D 1996RAND Journal of Economics1996,,27:1
7Separation of regulation against collusive behavior 显示文摘Laffont J J Martimort D 1999RAND Journal of Economics1999,30,7:1
8Continuity in mechanism design without transfers显示文摘David Martimort Aggey Semenov 2006Economics Letters2006,,2:1
9Exclusive dcaling,common agency,and multiprincipal incentive theory显示文摘MARTIMORT D 1996Rand Journal of Economics1996,27,4:1
10Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting 显示文摘Khalil F Martimort D Parigi B 2007Journal of Economic Theory2007,135,1:1
11To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships显示文摘Martimort D Pouyet J 2008International Journal of Industrial Organization2008,26,2:1
12Monitoring a common agent: implicaitons for finacial contracting 显示文摘KHALIL F MARTIMORT D PARIGI B 2007Journal of Economic Theory2007,135,1:1
13To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public–private partnerships显示文摘David Martimort Jerome Pouyet 2006International Journal of Industrial Organization2006,,2:1
14Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria 显示文摘Martimort D Stole L 2001Social Science Electronic Publishing2001,,1:1
15Exclusive dealing,common agency,and multiprincipals incentive theory显示文摘 DAVID 1996RAND Journal of Economics1996,27,1:1
16On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability显示文摘Hiriart Y Martimort D Pouyet J 2004Economics Letters2004,84,:1
17The Revelation and Delegation Principals in Common Agency Equilibria显示文摘Martimort D Stole L 2002Advances in Theoretical Econometrica2002,70,:1
18Separation of regulators against collusive behavior显示文摘 MARTIMORT D 1999RAND Journal of Economics1999,,30:1
19Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation显示文摘Jean-Jacques Laffont David Martimort 0,,02:1
20Collusion and delegation显示文摘Laffont J J Martimort D 1998Rand Journal of Economics1998,29,2:1
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